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Murray: Warrantless Arrests

NOTE

AFTER UNITED STATES v. VANEATON,
DOES PAYTON v. NEW YORK PREVENT
POLICE FROM MAKING WARRANTLESS
ROUTINE ARRESTS INSIDE THE HOME?

I. INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Vaneaton/ the Ninth Circuit held that
police did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution by making a warrantless arrest of a suspect who answered his door in response to their knock. 2 The
majority distinguished the case from the United States Supreme Court's holding in Payton v. New York,3 which ordinarily requires police to obtain a warrant before arresting a suspect inside his or her dwelling. 4 Instead, the court found that
the police did not need a warrant to arrest the suspect, even
though he stood within the identifiable threshold of the doorway, because he voluntarily exposed himself to the warrantless
arrest by freely opening his door.5 In so holding, the Ninth
Circuit ignored the firm line drawn in Payton by allowing a

1. 49 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (per Trott, J., joined by Thompson J.)
(Tashima J., District Judge for the C.D. of Cal., sitting by designation, dissenting),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996).
2. Id. at 1427.
3. 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (drawing a bright line at the identifiable threshold of
a dwelling and holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making
a warrantless entry absent consent or exigent circumstances). See infra notes 5369 and accompanying text for a discussion of Payton.
4. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427. The Payton rule also applies to motel rooms.
E.g., United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1987) (The Payton
warrant requirement applies to guest rooms in commercial establishments.).
5. Id.
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warrantless entry into a dwelling so long as police use no coercion and announce the arrest before stepping inside. 6

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1992, the Bend, Oregon police suspected John Vaneaton
in several burglaries. 7 In September, police went to Vaneaton's
motel room intending to arrest him.8 Uniformed officers
knocked on Vaneaton's door, but did not demand entry.9
Vaneaton looked out of his window, saw the officers, and
opened the door. 10 A detective asked if he was Jack
Vaneaton. l l When Vaneaton answered affirmatively, police
arrested him. 12 At that point, Vaneaton stood inside the
threshold of the door while the officers stood outside. 13 The
arresting officer entered the room only after notifying
Vaneaton that he was under arrest. 14 Mter handcuffing
Vaneaton and advising him of his Miranda rights,15 the police
asked for permission to search the room. 16 Vaneaton gave verbal permission and signed a written consent form.17 When
asked if he had a gun, Vaneaton directed the police to a closet
where they found a revolver. 18

6. See id. at 1429 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
7. United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995).
8. [d. at 1424-25. The parties did not dispute that the police had probable
cause to arrest Vaneaton for receiving stolen property. [d. at 1424. Police were
aware that Vaneaton had been selling jewelry stolen from the Bend area to Portland pawn shops. [d. On September 9, 1992, Bend police toured motels to determine whether Vaneaton had been in Bend when the jewelry was stolen. [d. at
1425. Police not only discovered that Vaneaton had been in town at the time of
the burglaries, but learned that he was staying at the Rainbow Motel that night.
[d.
9. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425.
10.
11.
12.
13.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

14. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425. "At no time did Vaneaton ask the officers into
his room, step back to allow them to enter, or indicate in any other way that he
consented to their [initial] entry [to arrest]." [d. at 1428 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
15. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Police must clearly inform a
person of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to
a custodial interrogation.).
16. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425.
17. [d.
18. [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss1/10

2

Murray: Warrantless Arrests

1996]

WARRANTLESS ARRESTS

137

At trial, Vaneaton moved to suppress introduction of the
revolver as evidence, claiming that the warrantless arrest
violated the rule of Payton v. New York. 19 Absent consent or
exigent circumstances, Payton requires police to obtain a warrant before entering a dwelling to make an arrest.20 The district court denied Vaneaton's motion which allowed the prosecution to secure a conditional plea of guilty to a charge of felon
in possession of a firearm.21 Vaneaton appealed the denial to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 22
III. BACKGROUND
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
applies to all searches and seizures by the government. 23 The
first clause protects individuals against unreasonable searches
and seizures by government officials. 24 The second clause requires warrants to be specific and supported by probable
cause. 25
The relationship between these two clauses has created a
recurring controversy in Fourth Amendment interpretation. 26

19. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1424. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). See
infra notes 53-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of Payton.
20. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. 573).
21. Id. at 1424.
22. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment also controls
searches and seizures by state officials through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. Id.
26. William W. Greenlaugh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the "Per Sen Rule:
Justice Stewart's Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause, 31
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1013, 1013-14 (1994). The Fourth Amendment does not explicitly demand warrants for all searches or seizures, but if a warrant is issued, it
must be specific and supported by probable cause. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Since the framers did not focus their attention on precise language, different interpretations have emerged. 27 One interpretation contends that the second clause should define the
first.28 Under this view, a reasonable search or seizure requires a warrant unless exceptional circumstances exist which
make obtaining a warrant impractical. 29
However, a majority of the Supreme Court reads the two
clauses independently.3o It contends that the government
need not obtain a warrant so long as the search or seizure is
reasonable in light of all the circumstances of the case. 31 The
Court balances the individual's expectation of privacy against
the governmental interest in investigating and preventing
crime. 32 Even under this interpretation, however, the Court
demands that police obtain a warrant to enter a home absent
consent or exigent circumstances. 33

27. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment's Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1389, 1391 (1989). The framers' immediate motivation was to protect individuals from indiscriminate searches conducted by the King's officers under the
authority of "general warrants." [d. at 1392. Therefore, James Madison's proposed
version to the first Congress contained only one clause directed to prevent the
abuses arising from "general warrants." [d. at 1391. The original proposal to the
first Congress provided that:
The right to be secure in their persons, their houses,
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be
searched, or persons to be seized.
[d. (emphasis added). However, before accepting the proposal, Congress amended
the phrase "by warrants issued" to "and no warrants shall issue." [d. The state
legislatures adopted and ratified this version of the Fourth Amendment with little
discussion of its precise meaning. [d.
28. Greenlaugh & Yost, supra note 26, at 1016.
29. [d.
30. [d. at 1014.
31. [d.

32. Thomas K Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After
Hodari D. And Bostick, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 799-800 (1991).
33. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); see infra notes 53-69 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Payton; see also United States v. Harris, 495
U.S. 14 (1990) (applying Payton).
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B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S ARREST WARRANT
REQUIREMENT

In United States v. Watson,34 the Supreme Court held
that a statute authorizing a warrantless arrest based on probable cause carried out in a public place did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 35 The strong presumption of constitutionality was not overcome in light of the statute's consistency
with the Court's prior cases, the common law, and the prevailing rule under state constitutions and statutes. 36 However,
the Court left open the question whether police needed a warrant to enter a suspect's dwelling to make an arrest. 37 The
Court answered this question affirmatively in Payton v. New
York.3s

In Payton, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the police from making a nonconsensual
warrantless entry into a suspect's home to make an arrest absent exigent circumstances. 39 However, four years earlier in
United States v. Santana,40 the Supreme Court held that a
suspect standing directly in her doorway as police approached
stood in a public place. 41 Considering these holdings, whether
Payton prevents police from simply knocking on a suspect's
door and then making an arrest when he opens it is not
clear. 42

34. 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (Having probable cause to believe the defendant possessed stolen credit cards, postal officers made the arrest without a warrant in a
public place.).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 415-19.
37. Id. at 418 n.6.
38. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
39. Id. at 576.
40. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
41. Id. at 42. See infra notes 43-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Santana.
42. Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois
v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and
Exaggerates the Excuseability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. Rev. 1, 17 n.43 (1991).
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1. United States v. Santana
In United States v. Santana,43 the defendant stood directly in her doorway as police approached. 44 When police identified themselves, the suspect retreated into the vestibule of her
house. 45 Without a warrant, the police pursued her into the
house to effectuate the arrest.46
The Supreme Court held that Santana was standing in a
public place when police first sought to arrest her. 47 The
Court found that "she was not merely visible to the public but
was as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if
she had been standing completely outside her house.,,48 Therefore, the Court ruled that Santana had no expectation of privacy while standing directly in her doorway.49
The Santana Court also held that a suspect could not
thwart an arrest set in motion in a public place by retreating
into a private place. 50 The Court found that once Santana saw
the police, there was a realistic expectation that any delay by
police in completing the arrest would result in the destruction
of evidence. 51 Therefore, the entry was justified as involving
"hot pursuit," an exigent circumstance which allows police to
enter a dwelling without a warrant. 52

43. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
44. [d. at 40. An officer testified that one step forward would have put her
outside, while one step backward would have put her in the vestibule of her residence. [d. at n.1.
45. [d. at 40.
46. [d.

47.
48.
49.
50.

[d. at 42.
Santana, 427 U.S. at 42.
[d.
[d. at 43.

51. [d.

52. [d. See generally 2 JOHN W. HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 22:27-30 at
113-123 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing four justifications for a warrantless entry into
the home: hot pursuit, possible destruction of evidence, likelihood of escape, and
apprehension of peril).
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2. Payton v. New York

Two years later, in Payton v. New York 53 and its companion case People v. Riddick,54 the Supreme Court drew a firm
line at the entrance of the house. 55 The Court held that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a warrantless
and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make an
arrest absent exigent circumstances. 56
In Payton, officers forcibly entered the suspect's home after
they received no response to their knock. 57 Although Payton
was not at home, officers seized evidence later used to convict
him.58 In Riddick, the suspect's young son answered the door
after the police knocked. 59 When the officers saw the suspect
sitting in bed through the opened door, they entered and arrested him.60 The Supreme Court held that both warrantless
entries violated the Fourth Amendment. 61
The Court noted that "physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed."62 The majority held that courts should treat warrantless searches and seizures inside a home as presumptively
unreasonable. 63 The majority agreed that:
To be arrested in the home involves not only the
invasion attendant to all arrests but also an
invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is
simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent
circumstances, even when it is accomplished

53. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
54. The Court consolidated Riddick with Payton and issued only one opinion.
Id. For the purposes of this note, the rules and principles announced by the Court
will be referred to as Payton.
55. Id. at 590.
56. Id. at 576. See generally HALL, supra note 52, at 113-123.
57. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576.
58. Id. at 576-77.
59. Id. at 578.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 603.
62. Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (quoting United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
63. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586.
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under statutory authority and when probable
cause is clearly present. 64

The Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to draw a firm
line at the entrance to the house, and held that, absent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant. 65
The Court then distinguished its reasoning in United
States v. Watson,66 which upheld warrantless arrests in public
places. 67 The majority found the common law rule on warrantless arrests in the home less settled than that for warrantless
public arrests. 68 The majority noted that the prevailing practice when the Fourth Amendment was adopted required a
warrant to make an arrest inside a home unless police were in
hot pursuit.69
3. Which Decision Controls When Police Summon the
Arrestee's Presence at the Door by a Knock?
Courts and commentators disagree whether Payton prevents the police from simply knocking on a door and then arresting a suspect when he answers it.70 Since Payton prohibits
only a warrantless entry into a home, police should not need to
obtain a warrant if the arrest can be accomplished without
crossing the threshold. 71 Payton does not prohibit suspects
from surrendering to the police at their door.72 One commentator argues that the legality of such arrests should not "be determined by resort to a plumb bob."73 He suggests that a "de

64. [d. at 588-89 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir.
1978».
65. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
66. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
67. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590-98.
68. [d. at 596.
69. [d. at 598.
70. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.1(e) at 589 (2d ed.
1987); HALL, supra note 52, at 127.
71. LAFAVE, supra note 70, at 590.
72. [d.
73. See id. A "plumb bob" is a piece of lead or some other weight attached to
a line used for determining perpendicularity. WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1107 (1989).
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minimis" breaking of the vertical plane of the threshold by the
arresting officer should not be a violation of the Payton rule. 74
However, another commentator argues that police should ob~
tain a warrant before knocking on a suspect's door because the
police invariably need to enter to perfect an arrest. 75
The Fifth Circuit relied on Santana to find that an individual had no protectable expectation of privacy after opening his
hotel room door to police. 76 The court held that the warrantless arrest of a suspect standing inside the threshold did not
violate Payton because the arrest was effected before officers
entered the room.77
However, courts have held that a person does not necessarily surrender his or her expectation of privacy merely by
answering the door in response to a knock.7s If the police assert their authority to arrest from outside a dwelling, the Seventh Circuit allows them to cross the threshold to the extent
necessary to complete the arrest only if the arrestee submits to
that authority.79 Some courts have maintained that an arrest
occurs in the home even if the arresting officer never crosses
the threshold. so These courts consider the location of the ar74. See LAFAVE, supra note 70, at 590.
75. See HALL, supra note 52, at 127.
76. See United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987).
77. [d. In Carrion, an agent aimed a gun at the suspect and ordered him to
raise his hands. [d. The court found that the suspect must have understood that
he was under arrest. [d.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1387 (7th Cir. 1991)
(people do not abandon their expectation of privacy by opening their door from
within to answer a knock), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 845 (1991); State v. Holeman
693 P.2d 89, 91 (Wash. 1985) (the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from arresting a suspect standing in the doorway of his house without a warrant absent
exigent circumstances).
79. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387. In Berkowitz, the government contended that
the agent notified the suspect that he was under arrest from outside the threshold
and that the defendant did not resist, but merely asked for his coat. [d. at 1380.
The government's version of the facts would not have violated the Fourth Amendment. [d. at 1385.
80. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 (6th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument that Payton is inapplicable since officers did not cross the
threshold until the defendant was arrested at the door), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1061 (1985); State v. Holeman, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (Wash. 1985) (rejecting the argument that Payton is inapplicable if police never physically cross the threshold
because it is the location of the arrestee that determines whether an arrest occurs
in the home).
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restee, not the arresting officer, to determine whether an arrest occurs inside the home. 81
4. Prior Ninth Circuit Decisions

Before the Supreme Court decided Payton, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Botero 82 held that police did not need
a warrant to arrest a suspect as he opened his door in response
to their knock. 83 The unanimous court noted that the arresting officers had not entered the apartment. 84 Therefore, the
court stated that an issue of a warrantless entry was not before them. 85 However, in dictum, the court noted that the arresting officers could have entered the suspect's apartment
because Santana held a doorway to be a public place. 86
After the Supreme Court decided Payton, the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Johnson 87 considered the police conduct to
determine whether a warrant was required to arrest a suspect
who opened his door after police knocked. 88 The Johnson court
held that the warrantless arrest in the doorway violated the
Fourth Amendment because the police used a subterfuge to get
the defendant to open his door.89 The Ninth Circuit recognized
that the defendant stood inside while the officers stood outside
the home with their weapons drawn. The court found that "in
these circumstances, it is the location of the arrested person,

81. [d. Courts commonly cite United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753,
757 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), for the proposition that it is the
location of the arrestee that determines whether an arrest occurs inside the home.
Broad reliance on Johnson may be unwarranted, however, because the court added
the qualifier, "[i]n these circumstances," which included the fact that police had
their weapons drawn. See id. at 757.
82. 589 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1978), cen. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979).
83. [d. at 432.
84. [d.
85. [d.
86. [d.

87. 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980).
88. See id. at 757.
89. [d. Police misrepresented their identities so "Johnson's initial exposure to
the view and the physical control of the agents was not consensual on his part."
[d. Other circuits agree with this reasoning. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 743
F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984) (warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment
when police obtained the defendant's presence at the door by flooding the house
with spotlights and summoned him with a bullhorn).
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not the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest
occurs in the home.,,9o
In United States v. Whitten,91 the Ninth Circuit upheld a
warrantless arrest of a suspect who stood in the doorway after
opening his door. 92 The Ninth Circuit relied on Santana for
the proposition that a doorway, unlike the interior of a hotel
room, is a public place. 93 Therefore, the court concluded that
the police did not need a warrant. 94 However, before United
States v. Vaneaton, the Ninth Circuit had not decided a case in
which the government conceded that the arrestee clearly stood
"inside" the threshold after answering his door to police who
had simply knocked. 95
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. MAJORITY: EXPOSED TO ARREST BY VOLUNTARILY OPENING
THE DOOR

The majority in United States v. Vaneaton held that police
did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution when they made a warrantless arrest of a suspect
who answered his door in response to their knock. 96 The majority noted that this case did not implicate the zone of privacy
that the Supreme Court sought to protect in Payton v. New
York. 97 The majority found that knocking on Vaneaton's door
did not resemble the kind of "invasion" or "intrusion" that

90. Johnson, 626 F.2d at 757.
91. 706 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1983).
92. [d. at 1015. Contra United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 n.2 (6th
Cir. 1984) ("To the extent that Whitten validates the warrantless arrest of individuals standing in the doorway of a private residence absent exigent circumstances,
we believe that this holding is contrary to the rule established in Payton. j.
93. Whitten, 706 F.2d at 1015.
94. [d. Although the warrantless arrest at the door was legal, the Whitten
court found the subsequent entry into the suspect's room to have violated the
Fourth Amendment since police had not obtained consent. [d. at 1016.
95. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423.
96. United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995).
97. [d. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton, the Supreme
Court stated that the "Fourth Amendment has drawn a finn line at the entrance
to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant." [d. at 590. See infra notes 53-69 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Payton.
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Payton guards against. 98 The majority distinguished Payton
by noting that in that case the entries preceded the arrests,
while police advised Vaneaton that he was under arrest while
still outside the threshold. 99
Although the majority recognized that police are prohibited from making a nonconsensual entry into a suspect's dwelling to make a felony arrest absent exigent circumstances, the
court refused to decide the case on whether Vaneaton was
standing inside or outside the threshold of the doorway.lOo
Instead, the majority focused on whether Vaneaton voluntarily
exposed himself to the warrantless arrest by freely opening the
door of his motel room to the police. 101
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on its earlier holding in
United States v. Johnson 102 that the warrantless arrest of the
defendant in his doorway violated the Fourth Amendment
because the police misrepresented their identities to get the
defendant to open his door. 103 According to the majority,
Johnson implied that police could arrest a suspect without a
warrant if he voluntarily opened the door in response to a
noncoercive knock. 104 The majority then noted the consistency
with its previous decision in United States v. Whitten,105 that
a warrantless arrest of a suspect standing in the doorway of
his motel room in response to a police knock did not violate
Payton because a doorway, unlike the interior of a hotel room,
is a public place. 106
Since the police used no force, threats, or any type of subterfuge to compel Vaneaton to open his door, the court found

98. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427. The majority noted that knocking on a door is
hardly a mark of a police state. [d.
99. [d. at 1426-27.
100. [d. at 1426.
101. [d.
102. 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980).
103. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426.
104. [d.
105. 706 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1983).
106. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976) (The Fourth Amendment is not violated by a warrantless felony arrest in a
public place.).
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that he voluntarily exposed himself in a public place. l07 The
majority pointed out the district court's finding that Vaneaton
opened the door voluntarily without police coercion. lOS The
majority noted that the trial court's findings should not be
overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. 109 Since
Vaneaton voluntarily exposed himself in a public place, the
majority held that his warrantless arrest did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 110
B. DISSENT: ANSWERING THE DOOR SHOULD NOT EXPOSE ONE
TO A WARRANTLESS ARREST

Judge Tashima, dissenting from the majority, asserted
that arresting a citizen inside his or her home without a warrant, merely because he opened his door in response to a knock
by police, is flatly contrary to Payton v. New York. lll To make
a warrantless arrest inside one's dwelling, the dissent maintained that Payton requires a showing of exigent circumstances
or of defendant's consent to the entry.ll2 The dissenting judge
noted that the government failed to make a showing of either.113 He suggested that Vaneaton, after seeing the uniformed officers out of his window, merely submitted to the
implied authority of the police and did not consent to their
entry into his motel room. 114

107. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427.
108. [d.
109. [d. (citing United States v. Al-Azzawy 784 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144 (1986».
110. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427.
111. [d. at 1427 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
112. [d. at 1428. In a footnote, the dissent cited Johnson, 626 F.2d at 757, for
the proposition that it is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting
officer, that determines whether an arrest occurs within the home. See Vaneaton,
49 F.3d at 1428 n.3. Therefore, the dissent concluded that it is unquestioned that
Vaneaton was arrested within his dwelling under Ninth Circuit law. [d.
113. [d. at 1428. The government also argued that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. [d. at 1428 n.2. However, nothing prevented the police
from obtaining a telegraphic warrant since four officers prevented Vaneaton from
escaping. [d. Furthermore, police did not have a justifiable apprehension that evidence might be destroyed as in a drug case. [d.
114. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1428. See United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423
(9th Cir. 1990) (Mere submission to the implied authority of uniformed police
officers at one's door does not imply consent.).
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The dissent characterized the majority opinion as adding a
new "voluntary exposure" exception to Payton. us However,
Judge Tashima asserted that neither Ninth Circuit nor Supreme Court case law supports a "voluntary exposure" exception. u6 His opinion noted that a recent Supreme Court case,
New York v. Harris,117 was factually very similar to
Vaneaton. us In Harris, the Court accepted the trial court's
finding that Harris did not consent to the entry and held the
warrantless arrest to have violated the rule of Payton. U9
Judge Tashima contended that the majority's use of case
law was misguided. 120 He pointed out that, independent and
unrelated to police conduct, the defendant in Santana stood on
the threshold when police approached her.121 In a footnote,
the dissent also pointed out that exigent circumstances justified the actual entry into Santana's home. 122 Judge Tashima
then attacked the majority's use of Johnson, in which the police misidentified themselves to coerce the arrestee to open his
door.123 His opinion noted that Johnson did not hold that the
warrantless arrest would have been legal if they had not misidentified themselves. 124 Although the Whitten court, relying
on Santana, found the suspect to be in a public place while
standing in the doorway, the dissent urged that the warrantless arrest would have violated the Fourth Amendment if the
defendant clearly stood inside the room. 12S He further argued
that United States v. Al_Azzawy 126 made clear that one may
voluntarily expose oneself to arrest only by stepping outside of

115. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1428.
116. [d.
117. 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (Police knocked on the door with their guns and badges
displayed and arrested the defendant after he let them enter.).
118. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1428.
119. [d. at 1428-29.
120. See id. at 1429.
121. [d.
122. [d. at 1429 n.5.
123. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1429.
124. See id.
125. [d.
126. 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985). In AI-Azzawy, police drew their weapons
used a bullhorn to order the defendant to come out of his trailer. Vaneaton, 49
F.3d at 1429. The court held that the defendant did not voluntarily expose himself
outside his trailer but emerged only under circumstances of extreme coercion. [d.
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one's home, not by remaining within it.127 The dissent urged
that the Ninth Circuit cases do not represent the proposition
that a citizen exposes himself to a warrantless arrest anytime
he answers a door to the police. 128 Therefore, the dissent concluded that the majority's position is inconsistent with
Payton. 129
Judge Tashima asserted that the majority's opinion not
only erodes the privacy interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment, but is also bad policy. 130 His opinion warned
that routine police investigation would be more difficult because the majority's decision discourages citizens from answering their doors when police knock. 131
V. CRITIQUE
The Vaneaton majority decided that police do not need a
warrant to make a doorway arrest as long as they do not use
coercion or subterfuge to compel the suspect to open his
door. 132 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit has ignored the firm
line drawn by Payton v. New York. 133 Instead, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a rule that effectively protects only those who
refuse to answer their doors when the police knock. 1M Since
police did not need to obtain consent or have exigent circumstances to enter Vaneaton's motel room, the dissent correctly
characterized the majority's opinion as creating a third exception to Payton's warrant requirement. 135 The Ninth Circuit
now permits police to cross a threshold without a warrant to

127. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1429.
128. [d.
129. [d. at 1430. Alternatively, the dissent argued that Vaneaton's behavior was
not voluntary. [d. at 1430 n.B. The dissent pointed out that "coercion is implicit in
situations where consent is obtained under color of the badge." [d. (citing Shaibu,
920 F.2d at 1427).
130. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1430.
131. [d.
132. United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995). See supra
notes 96-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority's analysis.
133. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1429 (Tashima, J., dissenting). Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
134. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1430 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
135. [d. at 1428 (Tashima, J. dissenting). See supra notes 111-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissent's opinion.
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the extent necessary to effectuate an arrest as long as the
suspect voluntarily exposes himself to arrest by freely choosing
to answer his or her door.l3G
Courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have relied on United
States v. Santana l37 to uphold warrantless arrests in doorways.l3B However, three factual differences distinguish
Santana from Vaneaton. First, the Supreme Court expressly
noted that the defendant in Santana stood directly in the doorway, not inside of it. l39 She exposed herself to public view,
speech, hearing, and touch as though she had been standing
completely outside her house. l4O Conversely, Vaneaton stood
directly inside the identifiable threshold of his doorway.l4l
Second, Santana stood in her doorway as police approached, not as a result of a summons by police. 142 The
Vaneaton majority cursorily stated that the zone of privacy
sought to be protected in Payton was not implicated in this
case. l43 However, there seems to be a significant difference in
the level of privacy an individual expects when answering his
or her door but remaining inside the threshold as opposed to
standing in an open doorway as police approach.l44 The Ninth
Circuit's decision in Vaneaton assumes an individual forfeits
his Fourth Amendment privacy interest by answering his
door. 145 However, individuals should be allowed to answer
136. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423.
137. 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (a defendant had no expectation of privacy while standing directly in her doorway). See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Santana.
138. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.l(e) at 589 (2d ed. 1987)
(Some of the post-Payton lower court cases have upheld warrantless doorway arrests by relying on Santana and describing the location of the arrestee as in the
doorway.); see, e.g., United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 1983)
(citing Santana for the proposition that a doorway, unlike the interior of a hotel
room, is a public place).
139. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40 n.1.
140. [d. at 42.
141. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425.
142. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40.
143. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427.
144. See United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.3d 1376, 1387 (7th Cir. 1991). The
Berkowitz court found that a person does not forfeit his privacy interest in his
home by merely answering the door in response to a knock. [d. "We think society
would recognize a person's right to choose to close his door on and exclude people
he does not want within his home." [d.
145. Accord United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) (The
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their doors without exposing themselves to a warrantless arrest. 146
Finally, Santana does not clearly stand for the proposition
that police are justified in making a warrantless entry to arrest anytime a suspect stands at a doorway.147 In Santana,
exigent circumstances justified the actual entry into the
defendant's home. l46 In Vaneaton, the majority did not contend that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry
into the motel room to effectuate the arrest. 149
Absent exigent circumstances or consent, Payton requires
police to obtain a warrant before crossing the threshold of a
home to make an arrest.150 The dissent correctly pointed out
that Vaneaton never gave his consent to the entry by police. 151 In United States u. Shaibu, the Ninth Circuit recognized that individuals do not expect others to come into their
homes, even though the door is open, without first requesting
permission to enter. 152 The court found that a defendant's
submission to an officer thrusting himself into an apartment
did not constitute effective consent. 153
Without a showing of exigent circumstances or consent,
Vaneaton allows police to enter a dwelling to the extent necessary to effectuate an arrest so long as the suspect "voluntarily
defendant had "no protectable expectation of privacy at the open door to his hotel
room.").
146. State v. Holeman, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (Wash. 1985).
147. See Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
148. See id. at 42-43. Santana involved "hot pursuit". [d. at 42-43. Police had a
realistic expectation that any delay would result in the destruction of evidence. [d.
at 43.
149. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1428 n.2 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
150. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
151. See id. at 1428 (Tashima, J., dissenting). See also United States v.
Edmonson, 791 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1986). After agents ordered the suspect to
open his door, the suspect opened it, turned around, and placed his hands on his
head. [d. at 1514. The court held that this did not amount to implied consent to
be arrested inside his residence since it was prompted by a show of official authority. [d. at 1515.
152. United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing
that we do not expect others to walk into our homes without consent even if the
door is open, and that an open door does not give police legal grounds to enter
the home without an explicit request when they infer consent from acquiescence).
153. [d.
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exposes" himself by opening his door. l54 In so holding, the
Ninth Circuit has ignored Payton's clear rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Vaneaton allowed
police to make a warrantless arrest of a suspect who opened
his door in response to a knock but remained inside the
threshold. 155 The court refused to accept the argument that
the Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New York required a
warrant, even when the police had to cross the identifiable
threshold to complete the arrest.156 With this decision, the
Ninth Circuit allows police to make a warrantless arrest inside
a suspect's dwelling so long as the suspect opens his door voluntarily and the police notify him of his arrest from outside
the threshold. 157

Bryan Murray·

154.
155.
156.
157.
•

See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1423.
United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1426.
Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423.
Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997.
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